The first step in solving the problem of corruption lies in diagnosing its root causes and determining the underlying factors. One of the most important facilitators of corrupt transactions is intermediaries who make corrupt dealings less risky, thereby increasing corruption. Even worse, there are spurious intermediaries who obtain bribes in connection with public services by pretending to have power over the issue. This deception may be carried out even if the officer providing the public service in question is honest. That is, these intermediaries are able to earn money by telling clients that bureaucrats must be bribed, even in cases where there is no corruption. The intermediary then pockets the bribe he obtains from the client. Oldenburg (1987) observed in an investigation of the Indian Land Consolidation Department in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh a “contradiction between a low incidence and a high reputation of wide-spread corruption.” It was noted that middlemen, who were trying to maximize their benefits, were trying to spread the rumor that procedures were mysterious, that real decisions were made behind the scenes, and that nothing could be achieved “without bribing the officials.” Thus, the administration is perceived as rather corrupt, even though the actual level of corruption is much lower. The interesting thing in these procedures is that whereas “normal” middlemen provide a “service” to clients in dealing with corrupt officers by decreasing the risks involved, spurious middlemen engage in pure deception, which harms all parties other than the middlemen themselves. The client wants to get a public service that is valuable to her. The person in charge of the service is the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat can be an honest person who does her job without demanding a bribe and rejects applications only if they fail to meet certain criteria. However, there is also the probability that the bureaucrat may be a corrupt one who expects a bribe from the client. If the application is acceptable but the client does not bribe, the corrupt bureaucrat will eventually accept the application but will slow down the process, increasing red tape. On the other hand, if the application is unacceptable and the client does not bribe, the corrupt bureaucrat will simply reject the application. The client makes her application to the public office without knowing which bureaucrat is responsible for processing her application. The spurious middleman (SM) works inside the public office, for instance, as a civil servant in charge of document receipt and dispatch, in a suitable position to observe the application and evaluation process. He, therefore, knows who is in charge of the client’s application and also has private insider information about whether this bureaucrat is corrupt or honest. The client, without observing the type of her application and the type of the bureaucrat, but after observing the SM’s claims and bribe demand, decides whether to accept or reject the offer.