Facts
This matter arose out of a domestic dispute between Alisha Berry (daughter-in-law) and Neelam Berry (mother-in-law). Neelam Berry had instituted a case under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, against her daughter-in-law, Alisha Berry.
During the pendency of the case, the Trial Court issued bailable warrants against Alisha Berry on 6th February 2024, prompting her to file a transfer petition before the Supreme Court. She sought to move the DV case to Ludhiana, Punjab, citing compelling personal hardships- she was unemployed, financially dependent on her father, and the sole caregiver of her specially-abled minor son, who suffers from hearing impairment.
In addition, divorce proceedings between Alisha and her husband had already been transferred from Delhi to Ludhiana earlier by a separate judicial order. The petitioner emphasized that facing multiple litigations in different jurisdictions was both oppressive and impractical.
Issues:
i. Whether the Trial Court was justified in issuing bailable warrants in proceedings initiated under the DV Act?
ii. Whether the domestic violence case ought to be transferred from Delhi to Ludhiana for the convenience of the petitioner?
iii. What is the true nature of proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act — and do they warrant coercive measures like warrants?
Analysis
• The Court emphasized that proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act are quasi-criminal in nature, and do not attract penal consequences unless there is a violation of a protection order under Section 31 of the Act.
• The issuance of bailable warrants — without any such violation — was held to be procedurally and legally unwarranted. The Court observed: ‘There is no justification whatsoever for the Trial Court to have issued bailable warrants in an application filed under the provisions of the D.V. Act.’
• The Court reaffirmed that warrants in DV cases are only justified if the respondent has breached a protection order under Section 31, which could then attract penal consequences.
• On the matter of transfer, the Court took into account the petitioner's financial vulnerability, the care requirements of her minor child and the fact that the divorce proceedings had already been shifted to Ludhiana. These collectively formed the basis to allow the transfer for practical and humanitarian reasons.
• The Court also directed that video conferencing facilities be considered, if available, to minimize inconvenience to the parties.
Judgment
The Supreme Court allowed the transfer petition and directed that the domestic violence proceedings pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, be transferred to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana, Punjab.
It further criticized the issuance of bailable warrants by the Magistrate Court and held that such action in DV Act proceedings, in the absence of a breach of a protection order, was wholly unjustified and legally unsustainable.
The judgment has a significant impact on how courts handle procedural aspects of domestic violence cases. It serves as a binding reminder to magistrates across India that proceedings under the DV Act are not criminal prosecutions in the traditional sense and should not invite coercive steps like bailable warrants unless there is a proven breach of a protection order. This protects litigants, especially women, from being unfairly subjected to criminal procedures in what are essentially protective and remedial proceedings. The ruling thus ensures greater respect for individual liberty and discourages the routine use of punitive measures in family-related legal disputes.
Beyond procedural safeguards, the decision reflects a progressive and empathetic judicial approach, especially toward financially and socially vulnerable women. By acknowledging the petitioner’s circumstances—such as unemployment, dependency, and caring for a specially-abled child—the Court has set a precedent for context-sensitive adjudication. The ruling also promotes judicial efficiency by supporting consolidation of related proceedings and embracing the use of video conferencing, making justice more accessible and practical. This judgment is likely to influence how trial courts approach domestic violence matters, ensuring they remain fair, humane, and legally sound.