Facts

The case stems from a criminal trial in Baruipur, West Bengal, where a 25-year-old man was convicted under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act for having a sexual relationship with a 14-year-old girl. The girl had run away from her home, become pregnant, and eventually gave birth to his child. While the trial court found him guilty of aggravated penetrative sexual assault and related charges under the Indian Penal Code, the Calcutta High Court later overturned the conviction on most counts. It held that the girl had willingly eloped, and treated the relationship as consensual.

What raised national concern were the High Court’s sweeping remarks about adolescent behaviour—criticizing young girls for lacking self-control and making broad statements about moral responsibility. These controversial observations, seen as blaming the minor victim, triggered public outcry.

Acting on its own, the Supreme Court took notice of the judgment and flagged parts of it as deeply problematic and potentially violative of fundamental rights. Around the same time, the West Bengal government formally appealed the High Court's order. The Supreme Court decided to consider both the appeal and its own suo motu action together.

Issues

i. Whether a minor's consent can be legally recognized in cases involving sexual activity, given the strict liability provisions under the POCSO Act?

ii. Whether the High Court acted within its legal authority by invoking Section 482 of the CrPC (now Section BNSS) and Article 226 of the Constitution to quash convictions under a special statute designed to protect children?

iii. Whether proper procedural and welfare measures were taken by authorities in handling the minor victim as required under POCSO and the Juvenile Justice Act?

Analysis

• The Supreme Court reaffirmed that any sexual act with a minor (under 18) is automatically treated as non-consensual under the POCSO Act, regardless of the victim’s supposed consent or emotional involvement.

• It held that the High Court erred in quashing the conviction based on the notion of adolescent privacy and mutual affection, as these considerations cannot override statutory child protection laws.

• The Court emphasized that the evidence clearly established penetrative sexual assault resulting in pregnancy, making the offence under POCSO and IPC fully proven.

• The High Court’s moral commentary on adolescent behaviour—such as urging girls to restrain their ‘urges’—was called irrelevant, inappropriate, and constitutionally impermissible.

• Justice Oka criticized the judgment for straying from judicial discipline, stating that a judge must rule based on law and evidence, not preach personal or moral views.

• The Court found that the State failed in its legal duty to protect the victim: she was not presented before a Child Welfare Committee, nor given shelter, education, or support as required under POCSO and the Juvenile Justice Act.

• It reiterated that child victims of sexual offences have enforceable rights under Articles 14 and 21, including the right to dignity, safety, and rehabilitation, which had been violated in this case.

• The Court accepted the High Court’s finding that kidnapping was not proved, but clarified that this did not affect the POCSO conviction, since a minor’s consent is legally invalid.

Judgement

The Supreme Court overturned the Calcutta High Court’s decision and restored the original conviction handed down by the trial court. It upheld the findings that the accused had committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act and was guilty of rape under the Indian Penal Code. However, it agreed that the charges related to kidnapping were rightly dismissed, as there was no evidence that the girl had been taken against her will.

The Court firmly rejected the High Court’s approach of treating the sexual relationship as consensual and criticized its reliance on the idea of adolescent privacy as a basis for acquittal. It emphasized that the law offers clear, age-based protections to minors, and such protections cannot be set aside on the grounds of mutual affection or personal circumstances.

Additionally, the bench condemned the moral tone of the High Court’s observations, calling them inappropriate and harmful. It stressed that judges must decide cases on legal grounds, not personal beliefs or social commentary.

Recognizing the broader implications of the case, the Court also issued directions to all States and Union Territories to strictly comply with child protection procedures under the POCSO Act and the Juvenile Justice Act. It noted that authorities had failed to support the minor victim and emphasized that every child victim is entitled to care, shelter, education, and counselling.

To assist the now-adult girl in moving forward, the Court ordered the formation of a three-member expert committee to guide and support her in making informed choices about her future.

Finally, the Court restored the sentence but deferred its final decision on punishment, awaiting the committee's report on the victim’s current condition and needs.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents (2024 INSC 614) carries significant legal and social implications. Most importantly, it reaffirms the strict liability nature of the POCSO Act, making it clear that consent is immaterial when the victim is a minor. This ensures that children under 18 remain under the full protection of the law, regardless of the nature of their relationships. The Court also delivered a strong message against judicial overreach, emphasizing that judges must not rely on personal beliefs, moral commentary, or sociological generalizations in criminal cases, especially those involving vulnerable victims. This helps reinforce the principle that justice must be grounded in law and constitutional values.

Furthermore, the judgment linked statutory duties with constitutional protections by holding that child victims have enforceable rights to dignity, care, and rehabilitation under Articles 14 and 21. The Court criticized the failure of the state and other institutions to provide the victim with necessary support and directed that all minor victims must be referred to Child Welfare Committees and provided adequate rehabilitation. In rejecting the High Court’s reliance on the “right to privacy” to justify acquittal, the Court drew a clear boundary: privacy rights cannot be used to dismantle protective statutes for minors. This interpretation ensures that constitutional rights are not misapplied in ways that harm the vulnerable.

Finally, the judgment offers crucial guidance for handling future cases involving adolescent sexuality. It clarifies that while courts may recognize the emotional complexities of such cases, they must not compromise legal protections designed for children. This ruling thus ensures consistency in judicial reasoning, strengthens child protection mechanisms, and prioritizes the welfare of victims within the constitutional and statutory framework.