Introduction

It is a landmark decision in Criminal Law providing significant insights into the application of Sections 34 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Supreme Court in this case addressed crucial issues related to criminal liability, particularly focusing on how Section 149 broad scope contrasts with Section 34 requirement of common intention. The decision also highlighted the importance of procedural fairness and the need to frame specific charges for substantive offences to ensure clarity and justice.

Facts of the Case

In the case at hand, Sadhu Ram was attacked and killed at the shop of Vas Dev. The Appellant, who was present at the scene with a Takwa along with his companions was accused of the offence. The post-mortem examination revealed that Sadhu Ram had multiple injuries inflicted by a heavy, sharp-edged weapon, potentially a Takwa. The Appellant and his companions were charged under Section 148, Section 302 r/w Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The Additional Sessions Judge observed that there was insufficient evidence for the charges of rioting under Section 149 but found the Appellant guilty under Section 302 r/w Section 34 of the IPC. Thus, the Judge acquitted three of the accused.

An appeal was filed in the High Court against the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge. However, the High Court upheld the conviction of the Appellant under Section 302 IPC for murder but altered the conviction of the other accused to Section 323 IPC instead of murder. The Appellant was sentenced to death. The Appellant filed an appeal in the Supreme Court against the decision of the High Court.

Issues

The main questions which was addressed in this case were-

• • Whether the Appellant could legally be convicted of murder and sentenced under Section 302 of IPC when he was not charged with that offence?
• • Whether Section 149 of IPC creates a specific offence?

Judgement

The Supreme Court in this case examined Section 149 of the IPC. The Court highlighted that Section 149 of IPC holds a member of an unlawful assembly liable for the offence committed by another member of the same assembly, even if the individual had no intention to commit that specific offence or did not actively participate in the act. The main principle under Section 149 is that the presence in an unlawful assembly can lead to liability for the acts of others, provided the assembly’s unlawful nature is established. The Court also highlighted that a charge of rioting under Section 149 must be proved before holding any individual liable for the offences committed by others in the assembly. Without a charge of rioting, an individual cannot be convicted of an offence not personally committed by him. The Court also observed that Section 34 of the IPC focuses on common intention to commit an offence. Under this section, several individuals acting in furtherance of a common intention can each be held liable for the offence as if they had individually committed it. This requires a shared intention to commit the offence and each participant’s actions are seen as part of the collective intent.

On the other hand, Section 149 does not consider common intention. It attributes the actions of one member of an unlawful assembly to all members irrespective of their individual intentions or participation in the specific act. This distinction between object and intention is crucial, while the object of the assembly might be common, the intentions of its members can differ. The Court referred to several key cases to clarify the application of Sections 149 and 34-

Conclusion

The case of Nanak Chand vs State of Punjab (1955) represents a crucial development in the interpretation of Sections 34 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The decision highlights that common intention required under Section 34 differs fundamentally from a common objective as covered by Section 149. Section 34 mandates a shared intent among individuals to commit a crime, while Section 149 holds all members of an unlawful assembly liable for crimes committed by any member of that assembly, regardless of individual intent. The analysis of the Court in this case underscores the broader liability imposed by Section 149 compared to the more specific liability under Section 34.