Navigating Nuclear Risks: Understanding India's Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010

The advent of nuclear energy, while promising a cleaner and more potent source of power, brings with it inherent risks. Accidents, though rare, can have devastating and far-reaching consequences. Recognizing this, India enacted the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act in 2010 (often referred to as CLNDA). This legislation provides a crucial framework for ensuring prompt compensation to victims in the event of a nuclear incident and clearly defines who is liable for the damage. Let's delve into some of the important sections and concepts underpinning this Act.

Core Objectives and International Alignment:

A primary goal of the CLNDA is to establish a "no-fault liability" regime. This means that victims do not need to prove negligence on the part of the nuclear plant operator to claim compensation. The Act also aims to channel liability primarily to the operator of the nuclear installation, streamlining the compensation process. Furthermore, the Act was a significant step towards aligning India's domestic legal framework with international conventions, particularly the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), facilitating India's participation in the global nuclear commerce and cooperation landscape.

Key Concepts and Important Sections:

• Operator's Liability (Section 4 & 6): This is a cornerstone of the Act. Section 4 establishes the strict and no-fault liability of the operator for nuclear damage. This means the operator is liable regardless of whether the incident occurred due to their fault or negligence. Section 6 sets a cap on the operator's liability. For nuclear reactors with a power of 10 MW or more, this liability is capped at ₹1,500 crores. For spent fuel reprocessing plants, it's ₹300 crores, and for research reactors below 10 MW, fuel facilities (other than reprocessing plants), and transportation of nuclear materials, it's ₹100 crores. The operator is mandated to take out insurance or provide other financial security to cover this liability (Section 8).

• Central Government's Liability (Section 7): If the compensation claims for a single nuclear incident exceed the operator's liability cap (as defined in Section 6), the Central Government steps in. Section 7 outlines that the government will be liable for damages exceeding the operator's limit, up to a maximum of 300 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). Since the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), the primary operator in India, is state-owned, a significant portion of this liability ultimately rests with the taxpayer.

• Right of Recourse (Section 17): This is arguably one of the most debated provisions. Section 17 grants the operator a "right of recourse" – meaning the ability to claim compensation from suppliers – under specific circumstances. This includes:

• • If such a right is expressly provided for in a written contract.
• • If the nuclear incident results from an act of the supplier or their employee, including the supply of equipment or material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard services.
• • If the incident is caused by an intentional act of commission or omission by an individual aimed at causing nuclear damage. This section was a point of contention for international suppliers, who were concerned about potentially unlimited and prolonged liability.

• Claims Commissioner and Nuclear Damage Claims Commission (Chapters III & V): The Act provides for a mechanism to adjudicate claims. Chapter III deals with the appointment of a Claims Commissioner who is responsible for inviting, receiving, and adjudicating claims for compensation. If the Central Government anticipates that the claims might exceed the operator's liability or deems it in the public interest, it can establish a Nuclear Damage Claims Commission (Chapter V). This Commission has similar powers to the Claims Commissioner and can also take over pending cases.

• Definition of Nuclear Damage (Section 2(h)): The Act provides a definition of "nuclear damage," which includes:

• • Loss of life or personal injury.
• • Loss of or damage to property.
• • Economic loss arising from the above.
• • Costs of measures to reinstate a significantly impaired environment.
• • Loss of income derived from an economic interest in the use of the environment, if significantly impaired.
• • Costs of preventive measures taken to avoid or minimize such damage.

• Time Limit for Claims (Section 18): Generally, the right to claim compensation for nuclear damage extinguishes if a claim is not made within ten years from the date the operator notifies the incident. For loss of life or personal injury, the period is twenty years.

• Exclusion of Jurisdiction of Civil Courts (Section 35): Once the Claims Commissioner or the Nuclear Damage Claims Commission is empowered to adjudicate claims, civil courts generally do not have jurisdiction over matters that these authorities are empowered to determine.

• Act to be in Addition to Other Laws (Section 46): This section has been subject to interpretation. While the Act provides a specific channel for nuclear damage claims, it also states that its provisions are in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other applicable law. This has led to discussions about whether victims could pursue claims under other civil or criminal laws. However, parliamentary debates during the Act's passage suggested that Section 46 is operator-specific and does not extend to suppliers for actions beyond the scope of the CLNDA.

Significance and Ongoing Discussions:

The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010, was a landmark piece of legislation for India. It provided a dedicated legal framework for addressing the complex issue of liability in the event of a nuclear accident, aiming to ensure that victims receive prompt compensation while also enabling India's participation in international nuclear commerce.

However, the Act, particularly its provisions on supplier liability (Section 17), has been a subject of intense debate both domestically and internationally. While proponents argue it ensures accountability from all parties involved, including suppliers of potentially faulty equipment, critics, especially foreign suppliers, have viewed it as a deterrent to investing in India's nuclear sector due to concerns about open-ended liability. This led to the creation of an Indian Nuclear Insurance Pool to provide a mechanism for suppliers to cover their potential liabilities under the Act.

Despite the debates, the CLNDA remains a critical component of India's nuclear policy, balancing the nation's energy aspirations with the imperative of ensuring safety, accountability, and a clear mechanism for redressal in the unfortunate event of a nuclear incident.