Introduction:

The case of Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar (AIR 1951 SC 458) holds a significant place in the constitutional history of India as it was the first major challenge to the Parliament's power to amend the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. This case arose in the immediate aftermath of the Constitution's enactment and addressed a fundamental question: could Parliament, by exercising its constituent power under Article 368, amend any provision of the Constitution, including the fundamental rights? The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which introduced significant changes to Articles 15, 19, and 31, and added Articles 31A and 31B along with the Ninth Schedule. This analysis will delve into the key issues raised, the Supreme Court's analysis, its judgment, and the long-term implications of this seminal decision.

Issues Raised:

The primary issues before the Supreme Court were:

• 1. Whether Parliament had the power to amend Part III of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights under Article 368?
• The petitioners argued that Article 368 only laid down the procedure for amendment but did not confer substantive power to alter fundamental rights, which were considered sacrosanct.
• 2. Whether the term "law" in Article 13(2) included a law passed by Parliament in exercise of its constituent power to amend the Constitution under Article 368?
• 2. Whether the term "law" in Article 13(2) included a law passed by Parliament in exercise of its constituent power to amend the Constitution under Article 368? Article 13(2) states that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III, and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. The petitioners contended that the First Amendment was a "law" under Article 13(2) and was therefore void as it abridged fundamental rights.

Analysis:

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, addressed both issues by interpreting Articles 13 and 368 harmoniously. Regarding the first issue, the Court held that Article 368 conferred on Parliament the power to amend any provision of the Constitution, including the fundamental rights. The Court reasoned that the term "Constitution" in Article 368 was comprehensive and included all its provisions. There was no inherent limitation on the amending power that excluded fundamental rights from its purview. The Court emphasized the distinction between ordinary legislative power and the constituent power exercised under Article 368.

On the second issue, the Court interpreted the term "law" in Article 13(2). It held that "law" in Article 13(2) refers to laws made by Parliament in its ordinary legislative capacity and not to laws made by Parliament in exercise of its constituent power to amend the Constitution under Article 368. The Court reasoned that an amendment to the Constitution is made by Parliament in the exercise of its constituent power, which is distinct from its ordinary legislative power. Therefore, an amendment made under Article 368 would not be subject to the limitations imposed by Article 13(2). To hold otherwise would render the amending power under Article 368 virtually ineffective in relation to fundamental rights. The Court adopted a literal interpretation of "law" in Article 13(2), confining it to ordinary legislation.

The Court also considered the historical context and the intention of the framers of the Constitution. It noted that the Constitution itself provided for its amendment, implying that no part was intended to be immutable. The First Amendment was brought in to address practical difficulties that had arisen in the implementation of land reforms and to give effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy.

Judgement:

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. The Court ruled that:

1. Parliament has the power under Article 368 to amend any part of the Constitution, including the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III.

2. The term "law" in Article 13(2) does not include a law passed by Parliament in exercise of its constituent power to amend the Constitution under Article 368. Therefore, the First Amendment was not void under Article 13(2) as it did not fall within the definition of "law" contemplated therein.

Conclusion:

The Shankari Prasad case established the crucial principle that Parliament possessed the power to amend any provision of the Constitution, including fundamental rights, by exercising its constituent power under Article 368. This decision had far-reaching consequences for the evolution of constitutional law in India. It paved the way for numerous subsequent amendments that significantly altered the Constitution.

However, the view laid down in Shankari Prasad was not to remain unchallenged. The scope of the amending power and the status of fundamental rights continued to be debated, eventually leading to the landmark Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967) case, where the Supreme Court took a different view, holding that Parliament had no power to amend fundamental rights. This divergence in judicial opinion ultimately culminated in the Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) case, which propounded the doctrine of the basic structure of the Constitution, placing limitations on Parliament's amending power by holding that while Parliament could amend any part of the Constitution, it could not alter its basic structure.

Despite being partially superseded by later judgments, the Shankari Prasad case remains a foundational decision in understanding the initial judicial interpretation of the amending power and its relationship with fundamental rights. It highlighted the inherent tension between the need for constitutional flexibility through amendments and the desire to preserve the sanctity of fundamental rights, a tension that has shaped the course of Indian constitutional jurisprudence.