Case: Tej Prakash Pathak vs Rajasthan High Court
BENCH- Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Pankaj Mithal, Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Justice Hrishikesh Roy
Introduction:
The case concerns the imposition of a 75% cutoff for the recruitment of translators in the Rajasthan High Court after the recruitment process had already begun. The question at the heart of the case is whether the introduction of a retrospective cutoff was permissible, and whether such a decision violated the principles of fairness, equality, and non-discrimination under the Constitution.
Facts of the Case:
On September 17, 2009, the Rajasthan High Court issued a notification for the recruitment of 13 vacant translator posts under the Rajasthan High Court Staff Service Rules, 2002. Candidates underwent a written examination and personal interview. However, after these stages, the then Chief Justice Jagadish Bhalla imposed a new requirement that the candidates must score 75% or above in the examination to be selected. As a result, only 3 out of the 21 candidates were selected. The unsuccessful candidates challenged this decision in the Rajasthan High Court, which dismissed their petition in March 2010. The candidates then filed an appeal in the Supreme Court in 2011.
Issues:
1. Whether the introduction of a 75% cutoff after the recruitment process had commenced was permissible under the law.
2. Whether the retrospective imposition of this cutoff violated the Right to Equality and the Right against Discrimination under the Constitution.
3. Whether the decision of the Rajasthan High Court to impose a retrospective cutoff was backed by valid statutory authorization.
Observations:
The petitioners argued that the retrospective introduction of the 75% cutoff violated the principle of fairness by changing the recruitment criteria after the process had started, which they argued was impermissible under K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008). The petitioners further contended that the Chief Justice’s decision was not authorized by valid statutes and violated the Right to Equality under Article 14.
The Rajasthan High Court, however, argued that strictly following the Manjusree decision would compel the hiring of candidates who scored better relative to others but overall had low scores. They cited State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha (1973), which allows higher cutoff marks to ensure high standards in recruitment.
The Supreme Court of India, in a majority decision delivered by a bench comprising Chief Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and other justices, upheld the principle that recruitment procedures, once initiated, cannot be altered to the detriment of the applicants' legitimate expectations. The Court reinforced the doctrine that changing the "rules of the game" post the commencement of the recruitment process is impermissible, ensuring that candidates are evaluated based on the criteria established at the outset.
The Supreme Court in this case arrived at the following conclusions:
1. The recruitment process commences from the issuance of the advertisement calling for applications and the filling of vacancies.
2. Eligibility criteria, once notified, cannot be changed midway unless explicitly permitted by the extant rules or advertisement.
3. If such changes are permissible, they must meet the standards of Article 14 of the Constitution, ensuring they are not arbitrary.
4. The decision in K. Manjusree (2008) remains good law and is not in conflict with Subhash Chander Marwaha (1973).
5. Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant rules, may devise an appropriate procedure for completing the recruitment process, provided the procedure is transparent, non-arbitrary, and rational.
6. Statutory rules governing the process are binding on the recruiting bodies, and administrative instructions may be used to fill any gaps where rules are silent.
7. While placement in the select list does not give an indefeasible right to an appointment, the State or its instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny appointment to candidates within the zone of consideration, provided vacancies exist.
The judgment further clarified that the appointing authority, in the absence of specific rules, can devise procedures for selection and set benchmarks for different stages of recruitment. Any benchmarks set must be made clear before the commencement of the recruitment process. If the rules or advertisement empower the appointing authority to set benchmarks, they may do so at any time before the respective stage, provided it does not surprise the candidates or evaluators.
Implication:
The judgment holds significant implications for public recruitment processes, particularly in terms of transparency and fairness. It establishes that recruitment criteria cannot be changed midway without proper statutory backing and must be clearly communicated from the outset. This ensures that candidates have clarity on the standards they need to meet and protects them from arbitrary decisions. The ruling emphasizes that while authorities can set benchmarks and modify processes, such decisions must be made before the recruitment process begins to avoid ambiguity or unfairness. The case reinforces the constitutional principles of equality, non-arbitrariness, and the need for adherence to rules in public recruitment.
